SYS: ONLINE LOC: ENCRYPTED TIME: --:--:--
◈ SHOP → CONTACT
Sedona Marlow
PAGE_NAME.SH // INITIALIZED
Sedona Marlow
[email protected]:~$ PAGE PROMPT TEXT HERE
§
// INTEL FEED INITIALIZING
This page publishes long form research intelligence. Each piece originates from a recurring journal thread or a current event demanding depth. The two verticals are hacking and critical minerals. The intersection — hardware supply chain security — is where the most important work lives. Research pieces publish when the work is complete. First dispatches incoming.
// INTEL WIRE · LIVE SIGNALS
HACKING China's April 2025 rare earth export controls exposed the hardware firmware dependency nobody had mapped. Research piece queued.
MINERALS DoD $400M equity stake in MP Materials — the first time the US government became a shareholder in a critical minerals company. July 2025.
OPSEC Mullvad survived a Swedish police raid with zero data produced. The architecture that made that possible is worth understanding.
INTERSECT Every rare earth magnet in an F-35 actuator passed through Chinese processing. The firmware on those actuators has never been independently audited. Both problems are the same problem.
HACKING · HARDWARE SECURITY · DISPATCH 001 IN PROGRESS
Firmware is the attack surface nobody audits. Here is the full methodology for changing that.
Secure boot, root of trust, supply chain firmware integrity. Three weeks of field pentesting data from hardware engagements across four clients. The attack surface nobody in the boardroom understands — and every nation-state adversary does. This piece covers the toolchain, the methodology, and the three vulnerabilities found in every single engagement without exception.
HARDWARE SECURITY FIRMWARE PENTESTING
MINERALS · SUPPLY CHAIN · DISPATCH 002 IN PROGRESS
China controls 91% of rare earth processing. The West has known this for a decade. Here is why nothing has changed.
The USGS has listed rare earths as critical since 2018. The IEA has published annual outlooks since 2023. The DoD invested $400M in MP Materials in July 2025 — enough to cover 3% of global demand at full capacity. This piece maps the gap between policy language and processing reality, and the 10-15 year timeline that makes reshoring a generational problem, not a quarterly one.
RARE EARTHS CHINA SUPPLY CHAIN
INTERSECTION · HARDWARE + MINERALS · DISPATCH 003 QUEUED
The F-35 problem: rare earth magnets, unaudited firmware, and a supply chain that runs through one country for both.
Every F-35 actuator contains neodymium and dysprosium permanent magnets. China processes 91% of those elements. The firmware controlling those actuators has no public audit trail. This is not two separate vulnerabilities. It is one vulnerability with two attack vectors — one physical, one digital — and the US defense industrial base has not mapped their intersection. This piece does.
DEFENSE FIRMWARE RARE EARTHS NATIONAL SECURITY
OPSEC · PRIVACY INFRASTRUCTURE · DISPATCH 004 QUEUED
Mullvad, a Swedish police raid, and zero data produced. The architecture that made that possible.
In 2023, Swedish police raided Mullvad's offices. They left with nothing. Not because the staff resisted — because there was architecturally nothing to find. No logs, no user records, no connection metadata. This piece breaks down the technical design decisions that made that outcome structurally inevitable, and what it means for anyone building privacy infrastructure at scale.
PRIVACY VPN ARCHITECTURE OPSEC
OSINT · FIELD METHODOLOGY · DISPATCH 005 QUEUED
OSINT for critical minerals: how to map a supply chain using only public data in 48 hours.
Shodan, corporate registry databases, shipping manifests, satellite imagery, LinkedIn, government filings. Every piece of a mineral supply chain leaves a public trace if you know where to look. This piece is a live walkthrough — tracing a single rare earth element from mine to magnet to finished product using exclusively open source tools. The methodology applies to any supply chain in any domain.
OSINT MINERALS METHODOLOGY
// INTEL · IDENTITY_RECORD · SEDONAMARLOW.COM/INTEL
@typeBlog · IntelligenceFeed · ResearchPublication
nameSedona Marlow Intel — Supply Chain + Security Research
intersectionHardware Supply Chain Security — firmware vulnerabilities in mineral-dependent defense systems
formatLong form · Cited · Structured · Research-grade
statusINITIALIZING — First dispatches in progress